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Summary  findings
Recent developments in a number of emerging  one of the key issues of Turkey's macroeconomic
economies have heightened interest in the relationship  management. Only by reducing its interest expenses can
between macroeconomic management and financial  fiscal deficits be reduced and greater stability be
regulation, in an environment of open capital accounts  achieved.
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Their analysis highlights the importance of fiscal policy  to foreign-exchange risk, and to large credit risks.
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contributed both to real exchange rate appreciation  and  external shocks, financial regulation must be
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I. Introduction
Turkey liberalized its capital account in 1989, taking an important step in its efforts to
integrate its economy with the rest of the world.  Since then capital inflows increased
significantly and the financial system became increasingly linked with external markets.
While in most other emerging market economies financial opening was accompanied or
preceded by fiscal and structural reforms, this was not the case in Turkey. The new regime
began under conditions of chronic and high inflation that averaged about 70 percent in the
late 1980s. Due to persistently poor public finances, this situation continued throughout the
1990s and achieving stabilization still remains a challenge. The financial sector has been
operating in this unstable environment and reforms to ensure its soundness have been
uneven. Liberalization of interest rates, easing entry of new foreign and local banks, and
permits for new products and services in the early 1980s led to a more dynamic financial
sector. However, improvements to the legal and supervisory frameworks to anticipate and
deal with weaknesses in the banking system have not been fully sufficient. Transparency,
consolidated supervision, orderly exit mechanisms, and accounting standards are still policy
issues to be addressed.
Turkey's experience with capital flows raises interesting questions.  To begin with,
what factors account for capital inflows with poor fiscal fundamentals? What are the
characteristics of such flows and how did they impact consumption, investment and growth?
An analysis of economic management during the 1989-1997  period in general and the post
1994 crisis period in particular is also called for, in order to draw policy lessons and to offer
some thoughts for a possible stabilization program. There are also important issues related to
the financial sector. How did capital flows, the volatile economic environment, and
regulatory policies affect the system's operations? Has the financial sector become weaker
and exposed to higher currency and credit risk as a result of real exchange rate targeting
policy?  These are the main questions we attempt to answer in this paper. In light of the
current global financial turmoil, our goal is to assess emerging vulnerabilities that relate to
capital flows in the Turkish financial system.
Our overall message is that capital inflows contributed to economic growth through
their positive impact on private consumption and investment, but also rendered monetary
policy ineffective and inflation path unchecked, given the particular policy mix of real
exchange rate targeting and high fiscal deficits. Although the authority's conscious policy in
recent years of maintaining external competitiveness helped reduce the currency's
vulnerability to speculative attacks, it led to an economy that lacks a nominal anchor.  Capital
flows also enabled the country to delay its structural reforms.  The failure of successive
governments to deal with structural problems resulted in the economy operating under a
cloud of vulnerability, particularly in terms of the worsening debt dynamics. In other words,
the underlying causes of stop-go stabilization policies, which generate considerable
uncertainty about the overall policy framework, and volatile economic growth, are still
present.-3-
The overall macroeconomic situation, which sets the broad incentive structure for the
operations of banks, has affected the financial sector. As a result of predictable depreciation
of the currency, banks borrow at cheaper rates abroad and lend it at high rates domestically,
expecting to earn more in net interest income than they lose from currency depreciation.  As
a result of the moral hazard created by extensive government guarantees and the lack of
effective prudential regulation and supervision, the banks take on substantial risks in their
interest rate exposures due to maturity mismatches, in unhedged foreign currency positions,
and in potential loan losses. Such risks and the existence of large confidence-sensitive
claims by nonresidents make the banking sector vulnerable to business cycles and shifts in
market sentiment. Although the state banks have much less exposure in market risks, their
operations are distorted by their heavy involvement in quasi-fiscal activities and the failure of
the government to reimburse the banks for the subsequent "duty losses".  Their losses are a
major source of liquidity risk to the banking system.
The rest of the paper is organized in three main parts.  First, we analyze capital flows
data and the determinants of capital flows and their impact on the real sectors of the
economy.  Seconcl,  we consider macroeconomic management issues relating to capital flows.
Thirdly, we review the interactions of capital flows with the financial sector. Section II
presents the basic capital inflows and outflows data and, discusses the main characteristics of
these flows and provides a decomposition of the capital account. In section III the setting for
capital account liberalization and the initial conditions with regard to the key macroeconomic
aggregates are presented, followed by some econometric evidence on the determinants of
capital flows.  Section IV discusses the effects of capital flows on consumption and
investment. Section V turns to macroeconomic management issues, including the exchange
rate, monetary and fiscal policies, that relate to capital flows and point out macroeconomic
vulnerabilities. Section VI turns to the financial sector and analyzes banking intermediation
of capital flows and issues surrounding the process.  Section VII concludes.
II. The Characteristics of Capital Flows
11.1 The Record
Despite the unstable macroeconomic environment, capital inflows to Turkey
increased steadily after 1990, 'with  net capital inflows reaching more than four percent of
GNP in 1996 and 1997. At the aggregate level, the volatility of capital inflows reflected the
volatility in economic activity. Turkey's GNP grew by more than six percent each year in
the 1990s, except in 1991 (the year of the Gulf Crisis which saw GNP growing by only
0.3%) and in 1994 (the year oif  a severe currency crisis when GNP contracted by six percent).
In parallel, total net capital inflows were also above two percent of GNP each year, except in
1991 and in 1994.,  when there was a net capital outflow.
In comparative terms, the relative level (in terms of GNP) of net capital inflows to
Turkey has been higher than that to Brazil before the implementation of the Real Plan, close
to the level of capital inflows to Indonesia, but lower than those to Mexico and Thailand.  In-4  -
terms of debt stock, at the end of 1996, Turkey's total extemal debt reached 43% of GNP, as
compared to 24% for Brazil, 49% for Mexico, 50% for Thailand, and 60% for Indonesia.
Table 1
Turkey: Net Capital  Inflows (US$ million)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Financial Account  4,037  (2,397)  3,648  8,963  (4,194)  4,643  8,763  8,616
Direct  Investment  700  783  779  622  559  772  612  554
Portfolio  Investment  547  623  2,411  3,917  1,158  237  570  1,634
Equity  (45)  56  300  431  994  120  198  (42)
Debt  592  567  2,111  3,486  164  117  372  1,676
Other Investment  2,790  (3,803)  458  4,424  (5,911)  3,634  7,581  6,428
of which:  short-term  3,000  (3,020)  1,396  3,054  (5,127)  2,305  5,945  1,761
Monetary  Authority  (130)  (1,060)  336  1,024  1,397  1,632  1,339  1,097
General  Govrnment  503  330  (1,310)  (1,953)  (2,516)  (1,991)  (2,232)  (1,406)
Banks  1,510  (2,199)  (374)  1,265  (4,612)  1,692  4,494  1,256
Other  Sectors  835  (880)  1,806  4,088  (180)  2,301  3,980  5,481
Net Erros  & Omissions  (469)  948  (1,190)  (2,222)  1,766  2,355  (1,782)  (2,523)
Sources: International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of Turkey.
T able 2
_Turkey:  Net Capital  Inflows (% of GNP)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
FinancialAccount  2.7%  -1.6%  2.3%  4.9%  -3.2%  2.7%  4.7%  4.4%
Direct Investment  0.5%  0.5%  0.5%  0.3%  0.4%  0.5%  0.3%  0.3%
Portfolio  Investment  0.4%  0.4%  1.5%  2.2%  0.9%  0.1%  0.3%  0.8%
Euity  0.0%  0.0%  0.2%  0.2%  0.8%  0.1%  0.1%  0.0%
Debt  0.4%  0.4%  1.3%  1.9%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.9%
Other  Investment  1.8%  -2.5%  0.3%  2.4%  -4.5%  2.1%  4.1%  3.3%
of which: short-term  2.0%  -2.0%  0.9%  1.7%  -3.9%  1.3%  3.2%  0.9%
Monetary  Authority  -0.1%  -0.7%  0.2%  0.6%  1.1%  1.0%  0.7%  0.6%
General  Govrnment  0.3%  0.2%  -0.8%  -1.1%  -1.9%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -0.7%
Banks  1.0%  -1.4%  -0.2%  0.7%  -3.5%  1.0%  2.4%  0.6%
Other  Sectors  0.5%  -0.6%  1.1%  2.2%  -0.1%  1.3%  2.2%  2.8%
Net Erros  & Omissions  -0.3%  0.6%  -0.7%  -1.2%  1.3%  1.4%  -1.0%  -1.3%
Sources: International Financial Statistics  and Central Bank of Turkey.
Table 3
Net Capital Inflows of Selected Countries  (% of GNP)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Mexico  3.3%  8.2%  7.6%  8.6%  3.9%  -4.4%  1.3%  -
Brazil  -1.3%  -1.3%  1.6%  1.8%  1.5%  4.3%  - -
Thailand  10.8%  12.2%  8.7%  8.6%  8.7%  13.3%  10.8%  -10.0%
Indonesia  4.1%  4.6%  4.6%  3.7%  2.3%  5.3%  5.0%  0.7%
Source: International Financial Statistics.- 5 -
There were a number of salient features of capital flows to Turkey. First of all,
capital flows have been very much a two-way phenomenon. While inflows have been much
larger than outflovvs,  Turkish investments abroad were also substantial in a number of years.
Turkish banks made large investments in foreign assets before 1994, and Turkish portfolio
investments in foreign securities (particularly debt securities) reached more than one billion
US dollars in 1996. Given that the current account balance in Turkey has been on average
less than two percent of GNP in the 1990s, Turkey cannot be said to be a large capital net
importer.
Secondly, net foreign direct investments in Turkey have been very small - it has never
been more than 0.5% of GNP in the 1990s. This is a somewhat puzzling observation given
that Turkey has a v,ery  dynamic private manufacturing sector, and Turkey is a major
manufacturing base for a number of important multinational corporations (e.g. in the
automobile industry). Thus, although there may well be a reasonably good presence of
international firms in Turkey, such presence has not brought about a large financial inflow
with it.
Thirdly, portfolio investments have not been as important as deposits, loans and trade
credits. In most years of the 1990s (except in 1997), deposits and credits were dominated by
short-term flows. Within the portfolio investment category, investments in equity securities
have been less important than investments in debt securities.  It is likely that such debt
portfolio inflows were mostly bonds issued abroad by the Turkish government and private
sector residents rather than foreign investment in domestic Treasury bills and government
bonds. There is not much information available as to the magnitude of foreign investment in
domestic government securities.
Fourthly, the public sector has been a net repayer to rather than a net borrower from
the foreign sector, though it still holds the bulk of the external debt stock, particularly that of
the medium-long term external debt.
Fifthly, foreign loans and credits made directly to non-financial private sector
borrowers seem to have been more important that the loans and credits made through the
banking sector. In terms of the distribution of the external debt stock, the banking sector's
foreign debt had been much larger than the non-financial private sector before 1994, but the
situation has changed considerably since. By the end of 1996 and 1997, the external debt
stock of the non-financial private sector was twice as large as that of the commercial banking
sector. It should be noted, however, that the loans and credits borrowed by the non-financial
private sector have,  often carried guarantees by the domestic banking sector, as we shall see
later. As a result the banking sector is not less exposed.
Finally, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the size of short-term flows in and
out of Turkey. Apiart  from the fact that there have been sizable "net errors and omissions",
the current account records very large unclassified invisible earnings. Whereas such items
could perhaps be largely accounted for by so called "shuttle trade" before 1996, the balances-6 -
for 1996 and 1997 have been estimated with "shuttle trade" already being taken into account
in merchandise exports. Therefore there could be substantial amount of short-term flows
which were captured by the official statistics on "short-term" capital inflows.
In terms of the volatility of the flows, it is noteworthy that, during 1989-1997, foreign
direct investments had the lowest volatility in all category of flows, whereas net errors and
omissions had the highest volatility. Loans, deposits and trade credits were more volatile
than portfolio investments, but most interestingly, there was no substantial difference in
volatility between short-term loans and deposits and long-term loans and deposits.
Table 4
Turkey:  Volatility  of New Capital  Flows
(Coefficient of Variation)
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  89-97
Capital Account  Balance  4.2  0.5  -1.6  1.0  1.0  -1.8  1.9  0.9  0.9  2.1
Foreign Direct Investment  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  1.2  0.9  0.9  0.8
Portfolio Investment  0.9  1.6  2.4  1.0  1.4  3.2  19.5  7.5  3.3  2.8
Other Long-term Flows  -2.6  -10.8  -4.3  -1.8  1.3  -1.9  -30.9  1.8  0.4  6.2
Other Short-term Flows  -4.1  0.7  -1.2  2.2  2.0  -0.8  2.9  0.8  3.2  5.6
Net Error&  Omissions  2.0  -6.8  3.2  -2.4  -2.3  5.5  1.8  -2.0  -2.1  -15.5
Source: Own calculation based on monthly central bank balance of payments statistics.-7  -
Table  5
Turkey: External Debt
(in billions of US Dollars; end of period)
Old Series  New  Series
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1996  1997
(By borrower)
Medium-Long  Term  42.9  48.8  54.3  57.6  59.2  64.1  69.6  _
Public  Sector  39.8  42.8  48.2  50.0  48.8  51.1  49.2
of which:
Consolidated  EBudget  25.8  28.3  30.4  31.1  30.2  31.4  30.8
State Owned Enterprises  5.1  5.4  5.5  4.8  4.4  4.9  4.7
Central  Bank  6.2  6.6  8.6  10.5  10.7  10.7  10.3
Private  Sector  3.2  6.0  6.1  7.6  10.4  13.0  20.4
of which:
Banks  - - - - - 2.7  5.1
Non-financial  Companies  - - - - - 10.2  14.1
Short  Term  12.7  18.5  11.3  15.7  20.5  20.5  22.6
Central  Bank  0.6  0.7  0.8  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9
Deposit  Money  Banks  7.2  11.1  4.7  6.6  8.5  8.4  8.5
Other  Sectors  4.9  6.7  5.8  8.0  11.0  11.1  13.2
(By type of credit)
Medium-Long  Term  42.9  48.8  54.3  57.6  59.2  64.1  69.6
of which:
Project  and Program  Credits  21.8  21.8  25.2  23.6  22.1  -
Bond  Issues  9.3  12.6  13.8  14.2  14.8  -
Short  Term  12.7  18.5  11.3  15.7  20.5  20.5  22.6
Credits  10.1  15.4  8.0  11.2  15.0  -
Credits for Imports  2.6  4.8  3.8  5.4  8.3  -
Pre-Export  Credits  0.9  1.1  1.4  1.6  1.6  -
FX Credits  to BEnks  5.1  8.7  2.2  3.2  3.9  -
Other  1.5  0.8  0.6  1.0  1.2  -
Deposits  2.6  3.1  3.3  4.5  5.5  -
Source:  Turkishn  Treasury.
11.2 Decomposition of the Capital Account
The balance of payments identity allows decomposing the capital account surplus (i.e.
net capital inflows) plus statistical discrepancies , into the current account deficit, and the
accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves.  The current account can further be-8  -
decomposed in to the net resource balance deficit, that is net trade in goods and services, plus
net factor payments and transfers. Table 6 shows the decomposition of the flows until 1997
in millions of US$, whereas Table 7 shows the decomposition as percentages of the Capital
Account, inclusive of net errors and omissions. The negative sign on most of the elements of
the Net Factor Payments and Transfers column in Table 6 indicates a surplus (net inflow) on
the account.
Although a sharp increase in the level of the trade deficit took place after 1989, no
clear pattern emerges on the allocation of the capital account among its three components in
the pre 1994 period. The last three years in the table show a larger allocation to reserve
growth compared to the current account. This is consistent with the post crisis policy of
keeping the real exchange rate constant, which resulted in heavy foreign exchange
intervention. Since inflows were particularly strong in 1995-1997,  the extent of reserve
accumulation has been substantial, as seen in Table 6. In the pre-crisis period, in the years
which saw heavy inflows such as 1993 and 1990, larger shares were for current account
deficit allocation as opposed to reserve accumulation. Chart 1 shows the evolution of the
capital account and its allocation between current account and reserve accumulation.
Chart 1
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The large and increasing size of recorded trade deficits of the recent years (which
now include an estimate of shuttle trade) with respect to capital inflows are noteworthy.
Financing of the trade deficits was made possible by the strong positive balance on the
invisibles account, especially non-interest and non-tourism revenues. Part of these were
likely to be short-term capital flows, which could be subject to sudden reversals. The- 9 -
relatively healthy current account position of Turkey therefore relies on unrecorded flows,
which may pose problems in the future.
Table  6:  Allocation  of Capital  Account,  US  $ Billions
Capital  Capital  Account  incl  Reserve  Current  Net  Resource  Net Factor
Account  Net  Account  Payments
Balance  Errors  and  Accumulation  Balance  Balance  Deficit  and  Transfers
Omissions
1986  2.1  2.3  0.8  -1.5  3.1  -1.6
1987  1.9  1.8  1.0  -0.8  3.2  -2.4
1988  -1.0  -0.7  0.9  1.6  1.8  -3.4
1989  0.8  1.8  2.8  1.0  4.2  -5.2
1990  4.0  3.9  1.3  -2.6  9.6  -6.9
1991  -2.4  -1.3  -1.0  0.2  7.3  -7.6
1992  3.6  2.5  1.5  -1.0  8.2  -7.2
1993  9.0  6.7  0.3  -6.4  14.2  -7.7
1994  -4.2  -2.4  0.2  2.6  4.2  -6.8
1995  4.6  7.0  4.7  -2.3  13.2  -10.9
1996  8.8  7.0  4.6  -2.4  10.6  -8.2
1997  8.6  6.1  3.3  -2.8  15.5  -12.7
Table  7  Allocation  of Capital  Account,
% of Total
Reserve  Accumulation  Current  Account  Net  Factor  Payments  Net  Resource  Balance
and  Transfers  Deficit
1986  35  65  -72  137
1987  55  45  -137  182
1988  -126  226  478  -252
1989  153  -53  -288  234
1990  33  67  -176  243
1991  80  20  593  -574
1992  60  40  -294  333
1993  5  95  -115  210
1994  -8  108  282  -174
1995  67  33  -155  189
1996  65  35  -117  152
1997  55  45  -209  254
III. The Liberalization of the Capital Account and Determinants of Capital Flows-10-
The surge in capital flows to developing countries in the early 90s are believed to be
partly associated with common external factors, such as the recession in industrialized
countries, and low interest rates in the United States. Yet, the countries receiving the largest
share of capital flows were also those that had undertaken fundamental fiscal and structural
reforms.  In contrast, liberalization of the capital account and the increase in capital inflows
took place against a background of considerable macroeconomic imbalances in Turkey, such
as deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, and high inflation. The absence of a stronger and
persistent increase in the flows to Turkey in the early 1  990s as experienced in other
developing countries points towards the relative importance of domestic and regional factors
in determining the flows.
To better understand the determinants and effects of foreign capital inflows to
Turkey, we first describe the macroeconomic setting under which capital account
liberalization took place.  The path of fiscal deficits was of great importance with respect to
the timing of capital account liberalization, and financing patterns were in turn affected
significantly by the easing of the external borrowing constraint.  We will then present
econometric evidence on the determinants of various components of the capital account.
11I.1 Capital Account Liberalization: The Process and the Motive
After experiencing a severe debt crisis in 1978-80, Turkey abandoned its inward
oriented policy stance and embarked on an export oriented growth strategy.  The key
elements of this change have been trade, capital account and financial sector liberalization.
By the mid-1980s all quantitative restrictions on trade were lifted and only  minimal controls
on the current account remained.'  The impressive export performance in the early 1980s
benefited to a great extent by significant alterations in relative prices (Celasun and
Rodrik,1  989), which served to enhance Turkey's creditworthiness in international capital
markets.  Turkey maintained a competitive real exchange rate throughout the 1981-88 period,
which was supported by a repressed real wage regime (Celasun, 1990, Boratav, 1990).
With increased political contestability from 1987 onwards, however, repression of
real wages became politically unsustainable. The real wage boom of 1989-90 and further
populist wage policies from then on had adverse impacts on Turkey's public finances, which
were already burdened by a sizable external debt servicing burden in the latter half of the
1980s. The policy of maintaining a competitive real exchange rate, which helped the private
sectors export performance in the mid 1980s, implied capital losses on foreign debt and a
deterioration of the terms of trade of the public sector vis a vis the private sector. Failing to
achieve a counterbalancing improvement in the primary stance, the government abandoned
the real exchange rate rule in 1989, and after that, the exchange rate appreciated in real
I  The drive to liberalize foreign trade culminated in a customs union with the European
Union in early 1996.-11-
terms.2 (See Chart 3)  The appreciation of the exchange rate not only eased the servicing of
foreign official debt, but the slower crawl of the exchange rate also implicitly served as a
nominal anchor and helped to control inflation in an environment of deteriorating fiscal
deficits.
Against this background, the move to fully liberalize the capital account started in
1989 and through a series of decrees Turkey accepted IMF's Article VIII in 1990. This
marked the completion of the external financial liberalization process, which was initiated in
1984 when Turkish residents were allowed to hold foreign exchange denominated deposit
accounts.  While the goal of capital account liberalization was put forward as further
integration with international capital markets, and in particular the European Union, Celasun
and Arslan (1996) suggest that easing of the financial constraint on surging public
expenditures was en important consideration underlying this decision.
Events in 1989 seem to confirm this view.  In that year, chronic inflation became the
major issue on the policy agenda. Aiming to limit the monetization of fiscal deficits, the
Central Bank and Treasury came to an agreement to constrain the Central Bank financing to
15% of total budgetary appropriations. With the share of net external financing by the public
sector also being rather limited, domestic borrowing became the main source of financing the
deficits.  Yet, with the exchange rate following a path of real appreciation, lending by the
domestic banks to the public sector was based on a rapid build up of short term foreign debt.
Ekinci (1996) notes that, with the Central Bank creating reserve money mainly against
foreign reserve accumulation, amd  external borrowing being delegated to domestic financial
institutions, short term capital inflows became the ultimate financing source of fiscal deficits.
11I.2 The Determinants of Capital Flows: Some Econometric Evidence
To capture the main determinants of net capital inflows, we follow the literature and
regress capital flows on a constant, the uncovered interest differential between Turkish three
month T-bills and the TL equivalent of three-month LIBOR rate, and the growth rate of real
GDP or the industiial production index. Estimation was done for total, portfolio and short
term capital flows, using monthly data for 1990-1997 as well as foreign direct investment
using quarterly data for the period 1990-19973. The results are presented in Table 8.
2  No objective behind the move to a (managed) float from a real exchange rate
targeting rule was ever officially announced. With increasing capital inflows, the feasibility
of real exchange raLte  depreciation had decreased substantially and the Central Bank seemed
not to have another option but allow for some real appreciation.
3  Since portfolio flows are mainly composed of debt instruments placed by Turkish
residents in foreign markets, foreign interest rates are likely to be most relevant measure of
opportunity costs of these flows. Therefore we broke down the uncovered differential into the
continued- 12 -
As expected, the uncovered T-bill interest differential is significant in explaining
short term capital flows. Total capital flows turned out to be significantly explained by the
lagged first difference of the interest differential, not its lagged level.  Growth rate of real
GDP, however, does not significantly (at 10 percent level) affect short term or total capital
flows. The insignificance of the growth of real GDP variable stands in contrast to some other
country studies (see for example Corbo and Desormeaux 1996) and seems to be suggestive of
the fact that, the most important pull factor of capital flows is the short run interest rate
differential rather than growth opportunities in the economy. While capital flows do
significantly affect the real variables in the economy as we discuss below, we were unable to
find significant effects of the dynamics of GDP growth on short term or total capital flows.
For portfolio flows, the foreign interest rate is a significant regressor, with a negative
sign. As the opportunity cost of placing debt securities in foreign markets increase, this
component of capital flows are negatively affected. This is consistent with the observation
that most flows in this category are debt related rather than equity investment.
For foreign direct investment, it turns out that, only the lagged real GDP growth rate
is significant, other than the constant. This is an expected result, because these types of flows
are necessarily longer term, and not related to short run arbitrage opportunities in the
financial markets.
LIBOR rate and the US equivalent of the T-Bill rate, and included these two in our
regression.- 13 -
TABLE 8
Dependent Variaible:  Total Capital Flows (TCF)
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic
c  234  3.18**
TCF(-1)  0.40  4.06**
AUIP(-1)  4794  2.62**
G(-1)  803  1.20
RL=  0.23  Durbin-Watson Statistic=  2.18  F-Statistic=8.00 (P-value=0.00)
Dependent Variable: Short Term Capital Flows (STC)
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic
c  67  1.20
STC(-1,)  0.42  2.35**
UIP(-1)  2199  1.76*
G(-1)  131  0.21
AR(1)  -0.16  -0.81
RL=  0.13  Durbin-Watson Statistic=  2.09  F-Statistic=2.94 (P-value=0.03)
Dependent Variable: Portfolio Flows (PI)
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic
c  57798  2.09**
PI(-I)  0.02  0.17
LIBOR(-  l)  -56234  -2.04**
TB3(-l)i  -1181  -1.57
G(-1)  -66  -0.19
RI= 0.09  Durbin-Watson Statistic= 1.94  F-Statistic=l1.99  (P-value=0.  10)
Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic
c  162  5.82**
FDI(-1)  0.02  0.13
UIP(-1)  9.96  0.13
G(-1)  142  2.56**
R2= 0.23  Durbin-Watson Statistic= 1.78  F-Statistic=2.60 (P-value=0.07)
Note: **: Significant at 5 %, * :Significant at 10 % .
IV.  Impact Of Capital Flows On the Real Economy
Capital flows and macroeconomic developments clearly have impacts on one another
through various channels. For example, the high growth rates of GDP in the most recent- 14-
years are by and large associated with growth in private consumption expenditure biased
towards durables, and also private investment, which increased demand for imports of
intermediary goods and external financing. 4 Increased capital inflows due to financial
developments may stimulate aggregate demand by increasing the stock of loanable funds in
the financial system, and domestic credit. In Turkey, the path of economic growth has been
closely associated with the amount of capital inflows. (See Chart 2).
We attempt here to analyze whether capital flows have an independent impact on
different components of aggregate demand, once other standard determinants are controlled
for. In doing so, we follow the approach of Kamin and Wood (1997) applied to the case of
Mexico, and a cross section of other Pacific Basin countries. We estimate separate
econometric models relating consumption and investment to a standard set of determinants,
and capital inflows. We also attempt to distinguish the effects of capital flows on various
breakdowns of aggregate demand, such as private and public consumption, and private and
public investment.
Chart 2
GDP  Growth  and  Capital  Flows
-6  -6000
f--  GOP  Growth  Rate (e6) lett  scale -Capital  Account  (Mill.  USS), right  scale 
IV.  1 Consumption
We use a standard set of easily quantifiable determinants of consumption in our
consumnption  equations. While consumption should be positively related to income, and
negatively to the real interest rate, the availability of credit may also be positively related to
See SPO (1998).- 15 -
consumption. Here, we used real M2 (inclusive of foreign currency deposits) as a proxy for
the stock of bank loans.  We also add the capital account to our equation.  Since capital flows
are assumed to affect real variables indirectly through their effect on interest rates and the
availability of credit, the inclusion of these variables in the regression would be expected to
reduce the coefficient on capital flows. The basic equation we estimate is as follows:
(1)  C =  Po  + PGDP + P2rir  + P3M2  + 4KA + E
We estimate this equation for private and public consumption separately, using
quarterly data for the period 1987-96. The first column in Table 3 shows the estimated
coefficients when the equation excludes real M2. 5 While real income and capital flows are
very significant and positive, the real interest rate is found to negatively effect private
consumption. The broad results are not significantly altered when real M2 is added to the
equation, as seen in the second column. Real M2 enters the equation with a significant
positive coefficient.  When the availability of credit as proxied by real M2 is controlled for,
the significance of the real interest rate declines, but not by a large extent.  Interestingly, the
results are altered considerably when public consumption is considered.
While one would expect that easier financing due to capital inflows would increase
public consumption, the effect of capital flows on public consumption are insignificant. The
results are shown in the last two columns of Table 10. The inclusion of real M2 does not
alter this result. Although the real interest rate becomes significant along with real M2,
capital flows are sltill  insignificant. We estimated error correction versions of the equations
as well, and finally estimated a parsimonious version of the equations, removing insignificant
explanatory variables.  The results are broadly the same: private consumption is positively
related to capital flows, but public consumption is not.  The results are in Table 11.
5  The estimation method used was maximum likelihood allowing for an AR(1) error
structure.- 16-
Table 10 Results for Real Consumption
Dependent Variable  Private Consumption  Public Consumption
Without M2  With M2  Without M2  With M2
Constant  4211  2244  334  -23.10
(7.81**)  (3.47)  (2.11**)  (-0.19)
Real GDP  0.49  0.49  0.06  0.04
(24.96**)  (22.42**)  (7.68**)  (3.64**)
Real Interest Rate  -1870  -1321  -703  -2188
(-2.23**)  (-1.72*)  (-1.58)  (-5.10**)
Real M2  2.26E-09  1.08E-09
(2.67**)  (3.82**)
Capital Account  0.13  0.13  0.004  -0.02
(2.96**)  (3.10**)  (0.20)
AR(I)  0.69  0.51  0.94)
(4.76**)  (3.12**)  -0.62  -0.72
(-5.03  **)  (
5.92**)
0.97  0.97  0.51
0.65
Durbin-Watson Statistic  2.26  2.05  2.08
1.80
F-Statistic  266  237  8.69
12.08
p-value of F-Statistic  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00
Note:  T- Statistics in parentheses. * :significant at 10% level, **:significant at 5% level- 17-
Table 11 Results for Real Consumption, Error Correction Version
Dependent Variable  Change in Private  Change in Public
Consumption  Consumption
Constant  936  665
(1.23)  (0.94)
Real GDP(-1)  -0.05  -0.03
(-1.33)  (-0.82)
Real Interest Rate(-  1)  2288  -1118
(1.26)  (-0.67)
Capital Account(-1)  0.08  0.038
(1.28)  (0.61)
AReal GDP  0.47  0.019
(15.8**)  (0.69)
AReal GDP(-1)  0.09  0.09
(4.37**)  (4.58**)




Durbin-Watson Statistic  2.39  3.15
F-Statistic  292  8.44
p-value of F-Statistic  0.00  0.00
Note:  T-Statistics in parentheses. * :significant at 10% level, **:significant at 5% level
IV.2 Investment
Our results for investment seem less robust to specification. We still use the three
monthly deposit rate as a proxy of the opportunity cost of funds, due to the lack of reliable
lending rate data. Although the levels of lending and deposit rates are different, the variation
in the deposit rate would be expected to track the variation in the lending rate reasonably
well. The results of the basic equation estimation for private fixed capital formation are in
the first two columns of Table 12. Though the capital account does not significantly affect
private fixed capital formation whether real M2 is included or not, the real interest rate
becomes significantly negative only when it is included.  But the sign of the coefficient of
real M2 is negative, which is not plausible. The results for fixed capital formation by the
public sector, as shown in the last two columns of Table 11 are not different.  Capital flows
do not significantly enter any of the two equations, while the implausible sign on real M2
persists.
Error correction versions of the estimation are summarized in Table 13. It can seen
that public investment still is not related to capital flows, but capital flows, in past level, or
past changes, do effect private fixed capital formation.  Based on the error correction- 18 -
specification results, we can not reject the significant effect of capital flows on private
investment, although the effect is not as clear as it is for consumption.
Table 12 Results for Real Fixed Capital Formation (FCF)
Dependent Variable  Private FCF  Public FCF
Without M2  With M2  Without M2  With M2
Constant  3180  80134  969  -1551
(2.72**)  (0.03)  (2.43**)  (3.88**)
Real GDP  0.08  0.08  0.04  0.09
(4.60**)  (5.13**)  (2.5**)  (4.12)
Real Interest Rate  810  -152  -6089  -4616
(0.78)  (-3.40**)  (-2.74**)
0.14)
Real M2  -3.08E-09  -1.9E-09
(-1.65)  (-2.85**)
Capital Account  -0.01  -0.04  -0.03  0.007
(-0.19)  (-0.82)  (-0.58)
AR(1)  0.91  0.99  (0.14)
(12.4**)  -0.40  -0.52
(I16.81**  (-2.25**)  (
3.08**)
Ri  0.88  0.89  0.22
0.37
Durbin-Watson Statistic  1.90  2.15  1.59
1.51
F-Statistic  61.8  51.3  2.44
3.89
p-value of F-Statistic  0.00  0.00  0.07
0.01
Note: T-Statistics in parentheses. * :significant at 10% level, **:significant at 5% level- 19-
Table 13  Results for Real Fixed Capital Formation Error Correction Version
Dependent Variable  Change in Private Fixed  Change in Public Fixed
Capital Formation  Capital Formation
Constant  1517  2473
(4.25**)  (3.95**)
Real GDP(-1)  -0.07  -0.12
(-4.76**)  (-4.36)
Real Interest Rate(-1)  3024  1763
(3.06**)  (1.02)
Capital Account(-  l)  0.13  0.11
(2.56**)  (1.29)
AReal GDP(-1)  -0.007  0.15
(-0.57)  (6.65**)




Durbin-Watson Statistic  2.18  2.83
F-Statistic  16.6  9.30
p-value of F-Statistic  0.00  0.00
Note:  T-Statistics in parentheses. * :significant at 10% level, **:significant at 5% level
V. Macroeconomic Management During Capital Flows
As already indicated earlier, Turkey opened up its capital account under conditions of
large fiscal imbalances and high and chronic inflation in sharp contrast to the experience of
East Asian and most Latin American countries. What were the effects of these inflows on
important variables such as the exchange rate and interest rates, and how did Turkey manage
its economy under these circumstances? In this section we first review the evolution of
exchange rates and consider how they interacted with the overall economy. Next, we review
fiscal and monetary policies with a view to assessing whether there was an internal
consistency among these policy tools given the capital inflows and the openness of the
economy.
V. 1 Capital Flovvs  and the Exchange Rate
The recent literature on capital flows to developing countries has shown that capital
inflows are associated with the appreciation of the real exchange6. To consider the evolution
6  See for example Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993), (1996),and Fernandez-Arias
and Montiel (1995).-20 -
of the real exchange rate Chart 3 plots three series. Like many Latin American countries that
experienced heavy capital flows, it is clear that Turkey also experienced real exchange rate
appreciation 7. The abandonment of the real exchange rate rule in 1989 coupled with
liberalization of the capital account indeed led to sharp real appreciation during 1989-90
which continued at a more moderate scale until 1994. With no fiscal adjustment and the
persistence of high inflation, choosing the exchange rate (govemed with a managed float) as
an implicit nominal anchor inevitably led to such real appreciation when combined with
capital inflows. This policy process backfired when further deterioration of the fiscal stance
combined with government's attempt to control interest rates on its domestic bonds-a
fundamental policy error when capital account is open-led to a correction of the real
exchange rate in the 1994 financial crisis, which is clearly visible in Chart 3.
Chart 3
Turkey: Real Exchange Rate
(1987=100)
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The response to the crisis was a stabilization program announced on April 5, 1994,
which was supported by a three year stand-by arrangement with the IMF.  Demand for
7  Capital flows are believed to cause exchange rate appreciation insofar as the
increased domestic absorption associated with the capital flow from abroad puts pressure on
the non traded goods sector, and increase its relative price.- 21 -
Turkish Lira denominated assets recovered due to very high real interest rates in the second
quarter of 1994. The program, however, had only short term success in meeting the fiscal
adjustment targets.  Exchange rate targets were announced from mid 1994 to mid 1995, and
foreign borrowing;  resumed in early 1995. With political tensions and early elections taking
over the agenda in late 1995,  the program was not implemented and the last tranche of the
Stand-by was never disbursed. That marked the return of the real exchange rule back on to
the policy agenda.
Central BaLnk  credit to the Treasury was gradually phased out in the post crisis period.
The Central Bank,,  having achieved greater independence, has chosen the relative stability of
the real exchange rate as its objective. In the absence of any lasting structural and fiscal
adjustment in the aftermath of the crisis, this policy has served to reduce uncertainty in the
foreign exchange market and maintain competitiveness of the export sector. In our view,
another important objective was to mitigate the build up of excessive short term foreign debt
associated with arbitrage opportunities that arise due to real appreciation in an uncertain
environment.
It is interesting to note the differences in the three real exchange rate series in the
chart above. The trade weighted series show a much more appreciated real exchange rate in
1993, before the crisis, consistent with the observation that currency crises are often preceded
by steep exchange rate appreciation 8. The same series also indicates a slightly larger upward
change (appreciation) in the real exchange rate index since 1994. The post 1995 stability of
the US$-TL real exchange rate index compared to the other two indices is also noteworthy.
The Central Bank.,  mainly intervening in the market for US dollars, seems to have been more
successful in keeping this index constant. With a strengthening US dollar, the TL has
appreciated against the currencies of Turkey's main trade partners. The appreciation in the
latter half of 1997 was partly dLue  to a conscious strategy by the Central Bank to minimize
potential speculation against the TL during the East Asian crisis.
Preliminary data suggest that the appreciation of the currency in real terms in the first
half of the 1998 was around 8-10%. However, it appears that the rate of nominal
depreciation in the last quarter of 1998 picked up and it is possible that real appreciation for
the whole year could be below 8 percent. It must also be noted that the Central Bank's
intervention in the foreign exchange market has been instrumental in avoiding a larger real
appreciation of the currency.  As our analysis of the decomposition of capital flows in section
II.2 showed, the C'entral  Bank's accumulation of reserves over the 1995-1997 period was
quite large, which was consistent with its constant real exchange rate policy.  While not
much is known about the long run equilibrium exchange rate for Turkey at present, the
overall post 1995 appreciation is indicative of the difficulties in attaining a constant real
exchange rate by the Central Bank when capital flows in and there are serious fiscal
imbalances at the same time.
8  See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996)- 22 -
Apart from the direct effects of capital inflows on exchange rates, there are other
possible indirect effects that need to be pointed out.  As a result of exchange rate and fiscal
policies becoming increasingly inconsistent with each other, the currency steadily
appreciated prior to the 1994 crisis (Chart 3) and this real appreciation was associated with a
stronger import boom and a relatively weak effect on exports. That an expected future
devaluation (due for example to inconsistent government spending versus the managed
exchange rate regime) can lead to a consumption boom is a well established result in the
theoretical literature, and implies a temporary surge in imported goods demand, which results
in increased home good demand and a real appreciation. 9 Elements of this "temporariness"
hypothesis seem to be present in the pre-1994 crisis experience. Another mechanism seems
to have the wealth and income affects that has been due to the domestic and asset yield
differentials, which we found in section III.2 to be the key factor pulling capital inflows to
Turkey. To the extent that such effects led to a higher demand for non-traded goods, the real
exchange rate would tend to appreciate.
V. 2  Financial Integration and Interest Rates
The liberalization of the capital account established a strong link between domestic
and external markets and this was expected to lead to a convergence of local and foreign
interest rates. However, over the last decade and particularly after the 1994 crisis, domestic
ex-post real rates have diverged significantly from foreign rates which were the main cause
of capital inflows as shown in section 111.2.  Chart 4 compares three month T-bills real rates
in TL (i.e., after adjusting for inflation), three month T-bill return in US$ (i.e., after adjusting
for lira depreciation), and the LIBOR. It is clear that Turkish rates, ex-post, have been high
by international standards since 1989. It is also visible that there has been a large volatility
and in a few occasions returns have been negative in real terms. While high real rates have
been a source of concern, the discussion in Turkey has rarely been in an open economy
context and policymakers often ignored or did not fully grasp the implications of open capital
account for interest rate determination -lack of such an understanding was the reason behind
the policymakers attempt to manipulate the auction rates of T-bills in 1993/1994 which
triggered the currency crisis.
9  See Calvo and Vegh (1993).- 23 -
Chart 4
Turkey:  Real  Interest  rates
Ex-post  annual  return  on  3-month  T-BilIs
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Given the oDpenness  of financial markets in Turkey, the starting point is the uncovered
interest parity condition.  It states that with no barriers to capital mobility, risk neutrality, and
no country risk, returns for simtilar  types and maturity of assets would be equalized through
arbitrage, and deviations from parity will be unpredictable and white noise (Frankel &
Okongwu 1995, Edwards, 1998). The fact that there maybe restrictions or taxes on capital
flows, and there ar-e  foreign exchange and country risks can put a wedge between domestic
and foreign rates, which will leave investors indifferent between holding foreign and
domestic instruments. This portfolio equilibrium differential can be expressed in real terms
as:
R(TR) =  R(US) + R + TX ± U(t)
where R(TR) and R(US) are real interest rates in US$ terms in Turkey and abroad (US or
euro dollar markeit)  respectively, R is the risk premium, which can be further decomposed
into the country pr-emium,  i.e. the compensation for holding claims on a country that is
perceived to be riskier than claLims  on the US; and the exchange rate risk premium, i.e., the
compensation for holding currencies that are perceived to be riskier than dollars. TX is tax
equivalent of any restrictions of capital inflows, and U(t) is an iid random variable.- 24 -
Using the condition above, it is possible to gain a perspective on interest rates in
Turkey. It is clear from this condition that real rates in Turkey must naturally be higher than
world interest rates by at least the country risk premium, the exchange rate risk premium, the
tax equivalent of any restrictions on capital flows (very little in the case of Turkey), and any
further premium that may be due to random shocks, such as the current global turmoil.
The differential between nominal interest rates and the rate of depreciation minus the
LIBOR rate could provide some idea about the magnitude of the risk premium.  Calculations
using this method show that risk premium has been high and ranged between 9-30 percent
after 1994, with an average of about 15 percent.  Of the total risk premium, the country risk
premium (which covers the risks of default and non-convertibility, etc.) can be proxied by the
spreads of Turkish euro dollar bonds over comparable (in terms of maturity and coupon
rates) US Treasury bonds.  Such spreads averaged between 200 basis points for three year
bonds to 400 basis points for ten year bonds in 1997. Clearly, the country risk premium was
not the dominant factor in the determination of the total risk premium.  Instead, the exchange
rate risk or policy risk premium has been the major factor in the determination of real rates in
Turkey.
The inability of successive governments to sustain a strong fiscal adjustment
program, stop-go attempts with stabilization, political fragmentation all factor into the risk
premium and keep real rates high.  The erosion of primary budget surpluses in 1997 that
Turkey managed to maintain during the post-1994 period needs to be seen in this context,
which has the effect of raising risk premium.  Last but not least, there is the possibility of a
large and sudden jump depreciation of the TL. A policy error, such as the one that triggered
the 1994 crisis, can lead to a large depreciation for which markets build a margin in the
domestic level of interest rates. The implication of this analysis is that a consistent policy
framework, supported by reduced political uncertainty and enhanced structural reforms, is
the key to lowering real interest rates in Turkey.
Finally, there is the random shock factor which can be significant in the determnination
of real interest rates. The current global crisis is a good example of such shocks and Turkey
is already feeling the effects of this type of a situation. Nominal interest rates rising to the
150 percent level (implying a real rate of close to 50%) and sudden reversal of capital flows,
about US$7-1  0 billion since the Russian crisis, are a manifestation of these shocks. It is also
possible that international markets can deny access to fresh borrowing or it could take place
at very expensive terms.  This has serious implications for macroeconomic management in
Turkey. It would imply the loss of one major source of financing of deficits.  This will have
the effect of increasing domestic rates even further. The problematic fiscal situation
complicates the policy response to such events and is a clear indication of the costs of not
addressing fundamental problems in good times.- 25 -
V. 3 Public Finances and Fiscal Policy
As we indicated  in the opening  of the paper, since Turkey  opened  up its economy
through  a series of reforms  in the  1  980s, establishing  fiscal discipline  has been a key policy
challenge.  Capital flows  to T  urkey have  been associated  with large public  sector borrowing
requirements  and over time  external  flows became  increasingly  important  in financing  the
deficits.  This situation  distorted the flow of funds in the domestic  financial  system  in favor
of the public sector.  The large  borrowing  requirements  have also been  associated  with
growing  share of interest  payments,  and large turnover  of domestic  debt.  While  a significant
portion  of capital  account have  been short term borrowing  and short term portfolio  flows, a
predominant  share of domestic  public debt has been of short term maturity.  This problem  in
turn has been  affecting all dimensions  of policy management  in Turkey's  open  economy.
Charts  5-7 summarize  the evolution  of key variables.
Chart 5
Turkey: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
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It is clear from the charts above that the fiscal stance until the 1994 crisis was on a
worsening path. After 1991, the primary stance of the government worsened, which
contributed to the risk premium in real interest rates, and the budgetary burden of interest
payments increased considerably. Both in 1992 and 1993 the primary budget balance was
negative and PSBR started to increase rapidly, coming close to 12 percent of GNP. Rather
than reducing expenditures, in mid-1993, the government started to resort to heavier Central
Bank financing of the deficits, as interest payments were identified as a potential area for
savings. Despite the deterioration in fundamentals, the government refused to pay higher
interest rates in the debt auctions in late 1993, and canceled several auctions altogether.- 27 -
The inconsistent mix of government policies in 1993 triggered devaluation
expectations, a domestic demand led boom, and worsened export performance and trade
deficit. When the crisis erupted in the first quarter of 1994, there was a massive outflow of
capital, and the Turkish Lira clepreciated  by almost half in nominal terms. Turkey managed
to cut some of the expenditures and a sizeable primary surplus was achieved in 1994. While
in 1995 and 1996 the Government was able to maintain a primary surplus position as shown
in chart 6 above, by 1997 these were largely eroded. Preliminary data suggests primary
surplus will be around 4 percent of GNP in 1998 thanks to higher revenues due to a new tax
law.  While this is a welcome development as it is a key condition for fiscal sustainability, it
is not clear how long it could be maintained.' 0 Structural reforms to maintain a sound fiscal
10  An important issue that needs to be mentioned here is the measurement of public
sector deficits.  The fiscal data discussed above refers to the consolidated budget which
excludes quasi-fiscal operations of public banks. As shown by Atiyas et.al (1998),
consolidating these into public sector accounts and netting out intra-governmental debt
change the primary balance situation significantly. This strongly suggests that policies for
fiscal adjustment to ensure consistency between debt and inflation targets should be based on
properly defined consolidated public sector accounts.
continued- 28 -
policy stance are not yet in place, and no significant reduction in the risk premium is near in
sight.
A more formal analysis of the interactions of fiscal policy and other key variables is
undertaken by Agenor, McDermott, and Ucer (1997) which confirms the above analysis.
They present empirical evidence on the effect of capital flows, government spending, and
interest rate differentials on the real exchange rate in Turkey for the period 1987-95. They
show that domestic macroeconomic conditions that lead to certain domestic and foreign asset
yield differentials result not only in endogenous capital flow responses, but also wealth and
income effects in the domestic economy, which tend to impact the real exchange rate.  While
their results imply an independent effect of capital flows on the exchange rate, they also
highlight a common factor underlying both capital flows and real exchange rate appreciation,
namely positive shocks to yield differentials, induced by fiscal policy.
V. 4 Capital Flows and Monetary Policy
The main development on the monetary front has been the gradual but steady decline
of the effectiveness of monetary policy and the loss of control of the Central Bank over
monetary aggregates. The high level of dollarization, and the high liquidity and short-term
maturity of T-bills have markedly eroded the potential effectiveness of monetary policy,
particularly with the increasing repo activity (more on this in the section on banking).
Against a background of chronic inflation, the share of foreign currency denominated bank
deposits have increased as a share of broad money, reaching almost 50 percent at the end of
1997.1 (See Chart 8).  The share of reserve money to GDP was less than a low 5 percent of
GDP in 1997, compared to an average of 10 percent for the OECD countries. The small size
of the monetary base makes a monetary expansion -due to increased credit to the Treasury or
due to foreign exchange purchases -more inflationary. The twelve month growth rate of
reserve money, the nominal exchange rate and the consumer price index (CPI) are shown in
Chart 9.
The broad policy objectives of the Central Bank of Turkey have been somewhat
different in the pre and post 1994 currency crisis episodes. While the real exchange rate
appreciation of 1989-94 eased inflation somewhat, the Central Bank was not able to control
its balance sheet during these years, due to its important role in financing the Treasury.
Overall credit increase to the public sector constituted the main source of Reserve money
I  I  Turkish residents are allowed to hold foreign currency denominated bank accounts
since 1984.-29 -
growth prior to 1994. (See Chart 10 on the Sources of Reserve Money Growth) In the
aftermath of the 1994 crisis, the Central Bank took a more passive stance and the main
objective of the Central Bank has been to maintain stability in the financial markets. Up to
September 1995, the Central Bank was committed to a certain ceiling on exchange rate
depreciation, actively using interest rates as an instrument.' 2 As stated earlier, between late
1995 and early 1998, the Central Bank's main focus has been the stability of the real
exchange rate.  This policy has attained a decline in overall vulnerability to a balance of
payments crisis at the expense of a higher level and inertia of inflation.
12  Demand fDr  TL recovered sharply after the second quarter of 1994, due to very high
yields on government paper, and  very slow crawl of the exchange rate.- 30 -
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Sterilization of Capital Flows
Whether the Central Bank engages in active sterilization of reserve flows by
offsetting changes in net domestic assets can be assessed by estimating a policy reaction
function, which relates a measure of monetary policy, including its net domestic assets
(NDA) to the change in net foreign assets (NFA) of the central bank.  The estimation of such
a function is complicated by the fact that there are two-way simultaneous interactions
between these variables when a Central Bank is engaged in sterilized intervention, calling for
instrumental estimation. Here, we follow the methodology of Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) to
estimate the Central Bank sterilization reaction function, with consideration of the
endogeneity problems. We also take into account the time series properties of the variables
in the regression, as proposed by Siklos(1996).
Our dependent variable (MP) is the change in Central Bank domestic assets, which
includes the revaluation account and is adjusted for reserve requirements. The revaluation
account is included in this variable, and excluded from the foreign assets, since the decision-33 -
to monetize capital gains on foreign reserves (to finance the Treasury for example) is a
discretionary change in domestic credit. Changes in minimum reserve requirements enter the
measure of domestic credit policy, so as to incorporate the effect of these changes on the
amount of deposit money the base supports. 
13
Other than the balance of payments, changes in NFA, the reaction function allows
MP to respond to various other variables. These are LEPPI, (log of) real exchange rate index
calculated using the TL/$ exchange rate and the producer price index, LRGDPSA, the (log
of) real GDP, seasonally adjusted, DEFSA, consolidated government's deficit, seasonally
adjusted. 14 Augmnented  Dickey Fuller tests indicated that MP, NFA, LEPPI and LRGDPSA
were nonstationary, moreover, cointegration tests (allowing for deterministic interventionist
dummies to account for possible structural breaks) resulted in a plausible cointegrating
relationship among the I(1) variables. This long run cointegrating relationship is included in
our first differences specification as the error correction term, EC.
Another issue to be addressed is the simultaneity between NFA and MP, due to the
capital account offset and sterilization attempts. Moreover, the conditioning variables
themselves may 'be  affected by a policy change in the NDA as well. Therefore, estimation
was carried out using two stage least squares, for the period 1990:02 to 1996:06. The results,
together with the list of instruments, are in Table 9.  The sterilization coefficient is a
statistically significant -0.37. Given that the lags of NFA (initially 3 were included) proved
insignificant, it seems about 37 percent of reserve flows were sterilized within a month, and
this was all the sterilization that took place.
13  See Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) for a thorough derivation of the measure.
14  Seasonal adjustment is done on DEF and LRGDP as the other variables did not show
signs of seasonality. The method used is X-  11 (additive). Given the big increase in the
deficit in 1994 (which could 'be  viewed as a structural break), its seasonal adjustment was
done by splitting the sample in to two, and separately adjusting both parts.- 34 -
Table 9:  Dependent variable: AMP
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistic
C  14.21  4.36**
AMP(-1)  0.34  1.91*
AMP(-2)  -0.31  -1.53
ANFA  -0.37  -4.45**
ALEPPI  252.1  2.38**
ALRGDPSA(-3)  223.1  1.75*
ADEFSA  -0.60  -1.87*
ADEFSA(-1)  -0.70  -1.80*
EC(-1)  -0.03  -2.03**
w  0.67
Durbin-Watson Statistic  1.97
F-Statistic  15.10
p-value of F-Statistic  0.00
Note: Instrumental variables used were: a constant, monthly dummies, three lags of the
dependent and conditioning variables, 6 lags of NFA, uncovered interest parity and three lags
of it.
Our result basically reflects that, although the Central Bank has ventured to sterilize
the effect of capital inflows on the monetary base at times, this has not been the focus of
monetary/domestic credit policy.  The role of public sector deficit financing has been the
main preoccupation of monetary policy during most of the period under study. Given the
large borrowing requirement of the public sector (which is sizable with respect to the
domestic financial system) the Central Bank has often been reluctant to drive interest rates up
by squeezing liquidity. In the same vein, complete sterilization has been avoided due to the
already high pressure of the borrowing requirement on the markets.
Our view is that, having a more defensive stance on the exchange rate in the pre-crisis
period, the Central Bank engaged in relatively more active sterilization and pursued a tighter
stance in the pre 1993 period. The 1994 crisis revealed the fragility of the system. With
direct cash credits to the Treasury being constrained, purchase of foreign exchange became
the main instrument through which the market was funded, facilitating the rollover/placement
of domestic debt. There had been some sterilization attempts in the first three quarters of
1995 due to strong short term inflows, but they were unsuccessful in the shallow financial
system.  There have been periods when the Central Bank eased the market, for example by
providing liquidity to the banks through the interbank market in late 1997 and early 1998.
During other episodes, such as in the second quarter of 1998, massive purchases of foreign
exchange were partly sterilized. The IMF Staff Monitored Program of July 1998, however,
envisions a target for net domestic assets, which implies that the Central Bank will not be
sterilizing reserve flows to a great extent.- 35 -
V. 5 Policy Mix ][nconsistency  and Macroeconomic Vulnerability
The revievv  of economic developments in the preceding sections is indicative of the
policy dilemmas wvhen  capital account is open and there are persistent fiscal imbalances.
Successive governments since the mid-1980s basically muddled through without structural
reforms that resulted in poor public finances. This type of policy process created major
inconsistencies between fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies creating a dynamic loop_
with problems in these policy areas exacerbating, and exacerbated by, each other. What kept
the system from exploding have been high GDP growth, occasional but incomplete
adjustment efforts that kept debt ratios broadly stable, and low initial debt level and its
composition, and a large component of monetary correction in the total deficit.  In this
section we consider the interactions between exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies and
their impact on public debt dynamics, which is an important source of vulnerability in the
macroeconomy.
Financial Openirng,  Debt Dynamics, and Macro Sources of Vulnerability
Financial opening interacts with fiscal dynamics in a number of ways. First, as the
interest parity condition given above shows, capital mobility brought about by financial
liberalization makes interest rates endogenous and market determined.  This implies that
domestic debt must be financed at market terms, which would include a large risk premium
given the perceived political and policy uncertainty. The effects of this can be understood by
analyzing the pathi  of cash debt accumulation' 5. The cash debt stock was 6.6% of GNP at the
end of 1991, but had reached 15.6% of GNP by the end of 1997. This has been the fastest
growing component of domestic debt and its fast growth implies that the costs of debt service
have been increasing rapidly. The fact that there is a primary surplus now but the PSBR is
close to 10 percent of GNP (as of last quarter of 1998) is a clear sign of the high financing
costs.  While debt/output ratio in Turkey is still manageable at about 35% of GNP, the recent
rate of growth of debt is a serious source of concern.
There are t-wo  factors that make it necessary to break the vicious circle (high
inflation-high real interest rate-high debt financing cost-monetization-more inflation) and to
minimize the possibility of a crisis.  The first is the shallowness of financial markets in
15  In addition to issuing Treasury bills and bonds through auctions to finance budget
deficits, the Treasury engages in debt restructuring with the other public entities, including
the Central Bank.  These off-budget operations transfer resources to public entities
(especially State Economic Enterprises) against equivalent obligations to the Treasury,
typically to service debt liabilities to third parties.  The "non-cash sales of bonds and bills"
represent such off-budget debt issuance. Such issues took up about 45% of total securitized
government debt in 1993, and still took up about 20% of total government debt in 1998.- 36 -
Turkey. The share of M2 (excluding foreign exchange deposits) is only 17 percent and
including FX deposits is 32 percent, quite low by international standards. The share of base
money in GDP has also been falling making monetary management a more difficult task.
The second factor is the change in composition of national savings. As the public sector
dissaved during last decade there were corresponding increases in the share of private
savings. Celasun and Tansel (1993) show that there has been a strong link between real
interest rates and private saving, which indicates that private savings will come at a high cost.
Putting these two factors together it is easy to argue that rolling over the domestic debt stock
will be a serious challenge given the heavy burden of public debt service (estimated to be
around US$27-30 billion in the first half of 1999). Further, locking in high interest rates now
will complicate a possible disinflation program as real interest burden will rise as inflation
falls. Hence, swapping the expensive domestic debt with cheaper foreign sources of
financing would need to be a key component of a credible stabilization program.
While the Central Bank could ease the situation by providing further liquidity in the
absence of capital inflows, this could only be a temporary solution. In fact, since the Russian
crisis the Central bank has been funding the market through open market operations,
offsetting capital outflows that were estimated to be US$7-8 billion in the last quarter of
1998. Sustained Central Bank funding in the market, without capital inflows, would
effectively mean central bank financing of the Treasury. This will require very careful
management of liquidity, otherwise maintaining stability in the exchange rate will be much
more difficult.
In sum, the fact that capital flows could quickly reverse themselves puts government
finance in a very vulnerable position. The government could find it very difficult to rollover
its debt in the midst of capital outflows. Explosive growth in interest financing cost and the
shortening of the maturity structure of the Treasury bills market added one important
dimension to the macro vulnerability of the Turkish economy.
VI.  Capital Flows, Financial Development, and Banking Sector Vulnerability
VI.1  Banking Intermediation of Capital Flows
The reform process in the financial sector began as part of the comprehensive
structural adjustment program in the early 1  980s. The government ended interest rate
controls, eased entry restrictions for domestic and foreign banks and non-banking financial
institutions, and allowed new types of instruments. Directed credit programs were reduced
drastically and policy measures to develop equity and bond markets were adopted. Although
there were setbacks and occasional policy reversals in terms of interest rate controls, such
reforms generated important changes in the sector. During the 1980-1990 period there were
31 de novo entries to the system, of which 19 were foreign and 11 were national. Freeing of
interest rates contributed to the financial deepening which had started prior to 1980. Product
variety in the market increased and quality of financial services improved. The arrival of-37 -
foreign banks raised the overall standards in the sector, especially in tenms of human capital
and information technology which was low prior to the reforms. 6
Following the reforms in the 1980s  and exposure of the sector to greater domestic and
foreign competition, Turkey's banking industry has grown in size and its structure has
become less concentrated. By the end of 1997, there were 72 banks operating in Turkey,
including 59 commercial banks, and 13 development and investment banks. Total banking
assets amounted to about US$95 billion, or equivalent to 65% of the Turkish GNP in 1997,
as compared to 29% in 1980 and 43% in 1990. In terms of size concentration, the five
largest banks held 44% of sector assets by end of 1997, some 20 percentage points lower
than a decade ago.  Turkey's banks are also among the most sophisticated in the emerging
Europe region.  Four of them are now listed on international stock exchanges. Many Turkish
banks are experienced borrowers on the international capital markets, receiving traditional
short- and medium-term bank facilities as well as borrowing through more innovative
structures, such as securitized receivables. Turkish banks have had sophisticated electronic
banking and information technology in place since the late 1980s. However, in a number of
areas Turkey's banks continue to rely on less analytically sophisticated methods for credit
assessment and management such as high collateral levels and short maturities, and lending
to large holding companies which they are part of.
The state banks continue to occupy a prominent position in the banking system--42
percent of assets aLs  of end 1997. However, these institutions have been progressively
weakened by their role in a range of quasi-fiscal activities, including subsidized credit and
agricultural comrrmodity  support arrangements. The Goverrnent's  failure to compensate the
state banks for their quasi-fiscal losses has led to decapitalization and acute liquidity
problems in these banks.
16  For a detailed review of financial liberalization experience of Turkey, see  Akyuz
(1990), Akkurt et. al (1992) and Atiyas and Ersel (1994).- 38 -
Table  14




















Source: The Banks Association of Turkey.
As our analysis in the preceding sections suggest, Turkey's banks operate in one of
the world's most volatile macroeconomic environrnents. During the 1990s annual inflation
in Turkey has ranged from 70-125%, while double digit foreign exchange and interest rates
movements have not been unusual.  Despite such volatility, Turkey's private sector banks
seem to have remained profitable by tailoring their strategy to this environment, although it is
hard to measure profitability in Turkey due to lack of inflation accounting and ongoing
problems with accounting standards.
High inflation and volatile asset prices have distorted banking activity and
performance. One consequence is the prevalence of short-term lending - over 85% of bank
loans have a maturity under one year. At the same time, high real interest rates on lira-
denominated instruments crowded out lending to the real sector, and at the end of 1997, loans
(excluding government-directed preferential credits) accounted for only 35% of total assets
of the banking sector. With lending activity restricted, banks placed 10% of their assets in
government securities and 14% on the inter-bank market at the end of 1997.
However, banking sector exposure to the government securities market is much
higher than 10% of their assets.  Banks have large investment positions in government
securities funded by repurchase agreements (repos) operations, both held off balance sheet.
There has been phenomenal growth in the repo volume in recent years, largely a reflection of
policy distortions such as differential tax treatments and reserve requirements. By the end of
1997, commercial banks had a net repo position with private sector customers of US$ 10- 39 -
billion (11% of total assets). Thus the exposure of the banking sector to the government
securities market is at least as large off-balance sheet as on-balance sheet. The importance of
the govermment  debt market to the banking sector is also reflected in the observation that
25% and 22% of total interest income came from investment in government securities in
1996 and 1997 respectively.
Table 15
Turkey:  Performance  Ratios  of the Commercial  Banks
(percentages)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Capital Adequacy
capital base/risk-weighted  assets  - - - 11.0  9.5  13.0  12.2  11.9
Asst Quality
non-performing loans/loans  4.2  4.9  3.2  2.9  3.4  2.3  1.9  2.2
Uquidity
liquid assets/total  assets  34.6  37.3  40.1  43.2  40.9  38.4  37.8  34.4
liquid assets/(deposits+  non-deposit funds)  45.3  49.4  51.7  54.7  50.7  48.1  45.3  41.9
FX liquid assets/Fx liabilities  48.0  48.9  53.2  54.3  56.0  48.4  47.9  43.1
Profinability
net income/average total  assets  2.6  2.0  2.3  2.9  1.6  3.0  3.1  2.6
net income/average shareholders' equity  34.7  27.6  36.8  47.4  24.3  47.0  50.9  43.8
Source:  The Banks  Association  of  Turkey  and  Central  Bank  of Turkey.
The volatility of inflation has also induced lenders to include in interest rates a
premium to cover their uncertainty which together with other factors, such as the government
demand for funds, has resulted in very high real interest rates, which is already analyzed in
more detail in section IV. The high domestic interest rates, real exchange rate appreciation,
and tax distortions have induced banks to borrow abroad to finance both domestic loans and
positions in the government paper market.  Some of the exchange rate risk on the loans is
reduced by lending foreign exchange but the banks do have foreign exchange risk to the
extent they use foreign borrowing to finance their purchases of government paper.  In using
the government securities for overnight repos, the banks also expose themselves to interest
rate risk.
Net Foreign Asset Position of Commercial Banks Turkish banks' liabilities to
nonresidents has grown from being negligible in early 1980s to 13% of total liabilities in
1993, and 12% in 1997. Though the foreign liabilities of the Deposit Money Banks grew
extremely fast in imost  of the years in the 1990s, these banks maintained positive foreign
asset positions until 1997. This is in sharp contrast with the major capital importer countries
such as Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico and Chile where the banking sector had large negative
foreign asset positions in the 1  990s. The situation in Turkey changed in 1997, however,
when the net foreign asset position of the banking sector turned negative for the first time.- 40 -
Table 16
TURKEY
Net  Foreign  Asset  Position  of Deposit  Money  Banks
(In million of U.S. dollars)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Net Foreign  Assets  1,177  1,797  2,164  1,340  5,454  4,670  1,343  (888)
Foreign Assets  4,973  5,486  8,549  10,719  8,724  9,976  9,452  10,553
Cash  305  365  384  432  559  666  920  927
Claims on banks abroad  3,818  4,822  7,624  9,529  7,007  8,079  6,651  6,742
Claims  on other non-resident  850  298  541  758  1,159  1,232  1,881  2,884
Securities and bonds  5  31  249  328  484  648  1,144  1,813
Credits  753  204  205  325  529  379  461  645
Equity participation  34  37  58  88  118  145  194  337
Other  58  27  29  18  28  60  82  89
Foreign Liabilities  3,796  3,688  6,385  9,379  3,271  5,307  8,110  11,442
Interbankdeposits  504  82  116  354  328  1,272  1,556  2,398
Loans  2,837  2,962  5,465  8,100  1,869  2,100  4,254  5,907
Non-residents  FCDs  247  412  571  731  953  1,806  2,028  2,931
Others  209  232  232  193  121  128  271  205
Source:  own calculation  based  on Central  Bank  data.
Table 17
Commercial  Banks'  Exposure  to Nonresidents
(% of total assets)
Claims  on nonresidents  Liabilities  to nonresidents
1981  0.1  0.1
1982  0.4  0.3
1983  0.9  0.8
1984  1.8  2.0
1985  0.2  0.2
1986  6.4  3.8
1987  6.6  3.9
1988  9.8  4.9
1989  8.0  4.5
1990  8.7  6.6
1991  9.5  6.4
1992  13.3  9.9
1993  14.9  13.0
1994  16.8  6.3
1995  14.6  7.8
1996  11.3  9.7
1997  11.2  12.1
Source:  for 1981-1989,  Atiyas  and Ersel  (1994);  for 1990-1997,  own calculation  based  on Central  Bank  data.-41 -
Table 18
Comimercial  Bank  Net Foreign  Assets  as Percentages  of Broad  Money
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Turkey  5.3%  6.0%  3.9%  17.0%  11.1%  2.6%  -1.7%
Thailand  -2.8%  -4.2%  -7.8%  -21.6%  -28.0%  -28.7%  -33.0%
Indonesia  -0.9%  -2.7%  -6.4%  -7.0%  -4.5%  -6.4%
Mexico  -4.3%  -3.3%  -4.3%  -5.4%  -2.1%  -1.5%  -0.7%
Chile  -7.8%  -16.5%  -15.1%  -14.2%  -9.5%  -6.3%  1.6%
Source: own calculation based on IFS.
The fastest growing foreign liabilities have been interbank deposits and foreign
currency deposits by non-residents. These deposits remained stable even during the 1994
currency crisis.  Loans from non-residents declined sharply during 1994, and although this
item has also been growing very fast in recent years, the growth has not been strong enough
for the loans to recover to the level as recorded in 1993. It is noteworthy that there has been
a structural shift in the composition of foreign loans. In pre-1994 crisis years, trade credits
(imports and pre-export finance) were not as important as other purpose foreign loans.  Since
the crisis, however, trade credits have been more important than other purpose foreign loans.
The fastest growing foreign assets have been portfolio investments abroad. Overall though,
the level of foreign assets has remained much less volatile than the level of foreign liabilities.
Foreign liabilities reached 24% of domrestic  liabilities by the end of 1997, as
compared to 32% aLt  the end of 1993 and 14% at the end of 1990. Data of the maturity
structure of foreign liabilities are hard to come by, but according to BIS, of the US$29.2
billion total claims on Turkey at the end of 1997 by BIS-reporting international banks, 56.3%
were claims of maturity up to and including one year. This figure was an average of all the
claims to banks, the public sector and the non-bank private sector. For the claims to banks, it
is likely that a higher percentage was of short-tern.  According to the Turkish Treasury, the
short-term external debt of the deposit money banks reached US$8.4 billion at the end of
1996 and US$8.5 billion at the end of 1997, out of total external debt of the deposit money
banks of US$1 1.1 billion and US$13.6 billion at the end of 1996 and 1997 respectively 17.
Thus in 1996 75% of deposit money banks' foreign borrowings were short-term, and in 1997
the ratio declined to 62%.
It is noteworthy that short-term loans and credits from abroad have been subject to a
levy of 4 percent by the Resource Utilization Support Fund.' 18 Thus despite the existence of
17  There is sorne discrepancy between Treasury data and Central Bank data of the
foreign liabilities of the banking system. The Treasury data show larger foreign liabilities of
the banks than Central Bank data. The discrepancy may have to do with the definition of
"banks" in their prospective coverage.
18  This levy was lifted in early 1999 in response to the Russian crisis.- 42 -
such a tax on short-term inflows, the magnitude of short-term flows have been more
important than longer-term flows. It also appears that part of the short-term borrowings from
abroad was due to tax arbitrage reasons. The fact that Eurobonds issued by the Turkish
government prior to 1997 were not subject to income tax in Turkey provided a strong
incentive for Turkish banks to conduct tax arbitration transactions.  Many Turkish banks
made substantial investment in government Eurobond issues motivated by tax advantages. In
order to finance these investment, banks made short-term borrowings from international
banks against which the government bonds were pledged as collateral. Essentially, the banks
were borrowing short-term money to hold long term Turkish government bonds.
An important feature of the Turkish banking system is the substantial off-balance
sheet contingencies and commitments (Table 20).  As of the end of 1997, total contingencies
and commitments reached US$85 billion (92% of total on-balance sheet assets), including
guarantees and warranties of US$29 billion (of which US$21 billion in foreign currency),
commitments (including repos) of US$23 billion (of which US$4 billion in foreign
currency), and foreign exchange and interest rate transactions of US$32 billion (of which
US$23 billion in foreign exchange). Thus, although the direct foreign liabilities of the
banking sector were smaller than those of the non-bank private sector, such on-balance sheet
liabilities may only be small part of the banking sector's overall liability to the foreign sector
ex post, in the event that such contingent guarantees are called.
Table 19
Turkey
Claims  of ENS-Reporting  Banks  by  Maturity  and  Sector
(consolidated  cross-border  claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies)
Distribution by maturity  _  Distribution  by sector
Total  Up  to and  Banks  Public  Sector  Non-bank
including  Over  one  year  Private  Sector
___  one  year
in billions  of  in percentages  of total consolidated  claims
US dollars
mid-1994  17.5  50.4  41.8  29.3  28.6  42.1
end-1994  16.2  45.0  46.2  21.7  31.3  47.0
mid-1995  17.5  47.6  44.6  23.2  31.8  45.0
end-1995  18.6  48.1  44.2  27.9  28.3  43.8
mid-1996  20.1  50.3  43.6  28.8  27.1  44.1
end-1  996  22.6  50.9  43.5  32.7  22.7  44.6
mid-1997  25.1  52.1  42.3  33.0  20.1  46.8
end-1997  29.2  56.3  38.5  34.4  17.6  47.9
Source: BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of Intemational  Bank Lending, various issues.- 43 -
Table 20
Turkey
Commercial  Bank  Contingencies  and Commitments
(US$ million)
Period  Guarantees  Fx and Interest  Rate
and Warranties  Commitments  Transactions  Total
1997  TL  8,075  18,875  9,393  36,343
FX  21,327  3,850  23,004  48,181
Total  29,401  22,725  32,397  84,524
1996  TL  7,213  16,162  4,630  28,005
FX  17,222  1,991  15,056  34,269
Total  24,436  18,153  19,686  62,275
1995  TL  7,041  7,970  4,794  19,805
FX  13,906  633  12,525  27,064
Total  20,947  8,602  17,319  46,868
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey.
VI.2  Capital Flows and Capital Markets Development
Since financial liberalization in the 1980s, Turkey's securities markets have grown
tremendously in size and in sophistication, though the dominance of the government debt
securities in the m,arket  has remained unchanged. Stock market capitalization has increased
from US$1 billion in 1988 to US$62 billion in 1997 (from 1% of GNP in 1988 to 31% of
GNP in 1997). The number of listed companies increased from 80 to 258, and turnover ratio
increased from 5.5 to 114, in the same period.  By the end of 1997, Turkey ranked 29th in
total market capitalization, 20th in total value traded, and 29th in number of listed domestic
companies, in the world (IFC, 1998).
Although stock market capitalization has surpassed the level of outstanding Treasury
bills and bonds, thLe  level of outstanding shares issued has been much smaller than debt
securities.  The value of outstanding shares was only 15% of the outstanding government
bills and bonds at the end of 1997. Private sector issues (of which 80% was equity issues)
was less than 5% of Treasury bills and bonds issued in 1997. In fact, private sector issues
have not shown arny  real growth since the early 1  990s, despite the phenomenal growth in
market capitalization and high real returns in equity investment.
Secondary market trading of government securities has also grown phenomenally in
recent years.  Value traded of government securities on the "outright purchases and sales
market" in the Istanbul Stock Exchange increased from US$312 million in 1991 to US$35
billion in 1997. Value traded on the "repo-reverse repo market" in the Istanbul Stock
Exchange increased from US$4.8 billion in 1993 to US$374 billion in 1997.-44  -
The very fact that the value of shares outstanding in the Turkish capital market has
been rather small as compared to government securities implies that the impact of the
collapse of an asset bubble will be limited, particularly to the banking sector. The stock
market in Turkey is known for its volatility, and at times the market seemed to be
overvalued, only to be corrected some months later, without too much effect on the rest of
the financial sector or real economic activity.
Table 21
TURKEY
Capital Markets: Selected Indicators, 1992-1997
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
(in trillion of Turkish lira)
New issues of securities
Total  172  402  926  1,840  4,787  6,638
Private  23  72  85  175  162  378
of which: shares  5  10  38  51  102  306
asset-backed securities  15  53  42  114  42  23
T bills and Govt. bonds  150  330  841  1,666  4,625  6,260
Trading volume in secondary markets
Total  682  2,031  6,163  22,248  73,446  186,515
of which: shares  56  256  652  2,375  3,040  9,086
govt. bonds  209  658  1,679  4,580  12,741  85,389
T bills  376  1,028  3,479  14,831  56,808  90,729
Outstanding securities
Total  196  382  729  1,498  3,221  7,025
Private  61  112  131  295  441  932
of which: shares  49  71  109  224  425  909
Public  135  270  598  1,202  2,780  6,093
(in percent)
Memorandum items:
Public sector share of:
New issues  86.9  82.1  90.9  90.5  96.6  94.3
Trading volume  85.7  83.0  83.7  87.3  94.7  94.4
Outstanding securities  69.0  70.7  82.0  80.3  86.3  86.7
Public sector outstanding securities
As percent of GNP  12.2  13.5  15.4  15.3  18.6  20.6
As percent of M2Y  42.7  56.8  50.5  50.5  53.8  59.3
Source:  own calculation  based  on data  from  Capital  Markets  Board  and  Treasury.- 45 -
Table 22
Istanbul  Stock  Exchange
No. of Listed  Market Capitalization  Trading Value  Price  P/E  Dividend
_  Companies  (in billion US dollar)  (in billion US dollar)  Index*  Ratio  Yield(-/%)
1986  80  0.94  0.01  132  5.1  9.2
1987  82  3.12  0.12  385  15.9  2.8
1988  79  1.13  0.12  120  5.0  10.5
1989  76  6.76  0.77  561  15.7  3.4
1990  110  18.74  5.85  643  24.0  2.6
1991  134  15.56  8.50  501  15.9  4.0
1992  145  9.92  8.57  273  11.4  6.4
1993  160  37.82  21.77  833  25.8  1.6
1994  176  21.78  23.00  413  24.8  2.8
1995  205  20.78  52.46  383  9.2  3.6
1996  228  30.80  37.74  534  12.2  2.9
1997  258  61.88  58.10  982  24.4  1.6
*US$  base,  January  1986=101
Source:  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange
Foreign Participation in Capital Markets  A milestone in the Turkish financial
liberalization process was the August 1989 issuance by the government of Decree No. 32
regarding capital account transactions. Under the decree, nonresidents were allowed to buy
and sell Turkish securities quoted on the domestic stock exchange or government securities
through intermediary institutions operating in Turkey. They were also permitted to transfer
income and the sales proceeds of these securities abroad through banks and other authorized
financial institutions.  Residents were permitted to purchase securities issued by foreign
countries through authorized financial institutions. They were also allowed to transfer the
foreign exchange required to purchase such securities abroad.
There is no information available as to how much the outstanding Treasury bills and
government bonds are now held by foreign residents. However, there has been a huge
increase in the proportion of shares held by foreign residents. Chart 11 shows that, according
to the Istanbul Stock Exchange, foreign holdings of the "free float" market capitalization
reached more than 50% in 1997, as compared to about 33% in 1996, and less than 5% in
1990. By the end of April 1998, net equity investments by foreign investors was
approximately US$7 billion.- 46 -
Chart 11
Net Equity Investments in Turkey by Foreign Investors
as % of free-float
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Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange
VI.3 Capital Flows and Financial Vulnerability
While increased financial integration may convey substantial economic benefits for
developing countries, free capital flows also expose these countries to the risks and costs
imposed on the economy by abrupt and large reversals of capital flows because of changes in
creditor perceptions. A country may become financially vulnerable externally if there are
large risks in its financial system that constrain foreign exchange liquidity. As we can see
from earlier sections, foreign loans and credits to Turkey have been rather volatile, and
Turkey experienced a sharp reversal of capital flows and a severe currency crisis in 1994. As
a result, there was a sharp contraction of credit to the real sector and real economic activity
contracted by 6% in that year. In this section we assess the liquidity risks, particularly
foreign exchange liquidity risks, currently facing the Turkish banking system, and the ability
of the commercial banks and the authorities to handle those risks.
Adequacy of International Reserves In traditional models of balance of payments,
the vulnerability to a speculative attack usually results from a drainage of reserves following
an excessive flow domestic credit expansion. Recent developments in the literature suggest
that a currency can be subject to attack even without a flow fiscal deficit that causes a
drainage of reserves, if the stock of broad money greatly exceeds the stock of foreign
exchange reserves.  When capital inflows suffer a reversal, not only do gross inflows dry up,
but also holders of liquid domestic liabilities try to convert them into foreign exchange and
flee the country. Thus reserves must be compared with a broad measure of liquid monetary
assets in order to determine a country's vulnerability to panic.- 47 -
Net foreign reserves have grown rapidly in recent years in Turkey, and Table 23
below shows that the ratio of broad money to foreign reserves have declined. Though the
ratio does not look particularly high as compared to a number of other large capital importer
countries, whether the reserves are all freely usable is an issue of concern in the case of
Turkey. While the central bank has fairly conservative foreign exchange management
policies, and it does not engage in foreign exchange guarantees, forward contract or swap
positions, a large part of the net international foreign reserves represent foreign currency
deposits with the central bank by foreign residents of Turkish origin through the Dresdner
Scheme'9 or similar arrangements. Although the balance of such deposits does not exhibit
high volatility, its stability cannot be taken for granted.
Table 23
Turkey: System Uquidity
Ratio of Short-term Debt  Short-term Debt  Ratio of Broad Money  Ratio of Broad Money+ Repos
to  Foreign Reserves  as Flrcentage  of Total Debt  to Foreign Reserves  to Foreign Reserves
1993  2.4  28%  4.3  4.3
1994  1.3  17%  4.0  4.1
1995  1.1  21%  3.4  3.4
1996  1.2  26%  3.0  3.1
1997  1.2  27%  3.0  3.2
Source: Own calculation based on Central Bank data.
Table 24
System  Uquidity  in Seleted  Countries  as of June 1997
Ratio of Short-terrm  Debt  Short-term Debt  Ratio of Broad Money
to Foreign Reserves  as Percentage  of Total Debt  to Foreign Reserves
Korea  3.0  67%  6.2
Indonesia  1  .6  24%  6.2
Thailand  1.1  46%  4.9
Philippines  0.7  19%  4.9
Malaysia  0.6  39%  4.0
Source:  Goldstein  (1998),  p11.
19  The Dresdner Scheme is a special arrangement between Dresdner Bank in Germany
and the Central Bank of Turkey, to attract deposits of Turkish workers residing in Germany.
The Central Bank of Turkey sets the interest rates offered under the scheme, with the
Dresdner Bank acting as an agent to facilitate remittances back to Turkey.- 48 -
Table 25
TURKEY
Net Foreign Asset Position of the Central Bank
(In  million  of U.S.  dollars)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
NFA  -449  -87  1,601  1,142  -659  2,008  5,894  8,557
Net international  reserves  7,296  6,400  7,607  7,700  8,232  13,067  16,950  18,917
Gold  1,467  1,492  1,494  1,488  1,420  1,383  1,383  1,124
Foreign bank notes  222  366  429  626  422  796  292  363
Correspondent accounts  5,683  4,547  5,687  5,587  6,740  11,595  15,980  18,056
Intemational reserve liabilities  76  4  2  1  350  706  706  626
Other foreign liabilities  (net)  7,744  6,487  6,007  6,558  8,891  11,059  11,056  10,360
Non-resident FCDs  7,534  6,432  6,368  6,975  9,290  11,558  11,949  11,360
Medium-term loans (net) I/  -1,196  -1,106  -1,093  -1,039  -1,073  -1,110  -1,167  -1,218
Others  (net)  1,407  1,160  731  622  674  611  274  217
Source: Statistics Department of the Central Bank of Turkey.
1/ Mainly foreign credit extended.
Open Foreign Exchange Positions and Maturity Mismatches  Largely as a result
of chronically high inflation and asset substitution, the government's overwhelming
borrowing presence in Turkey's financial markets, and due to the unique set of tax and
regulatory incentives affecting banks and their customers (e.g. the blanket deposit guarantee
provided by the government), many Turkish banks have turned to arbitrage activities to
generate a substantial portion of their profits.  In particular, many private-sector banks run
large currency and interest rate risk positions than would be considered prudent in most
countries. A number of banks run open foreign exchange positions that exceed the already
generous regulatory limit of 50% of capital. 20 Such behavior is also a reflection of moral
hazard as a result of the existence of extensive govemment guarantee on deposits and
regulatory forbearance. The fact that the regulatory authorities allowed non-compliance
without imposing serious sanctions encouraged the banks to continue taking large foreign
exchange risks.
The Turkish banking sector was hard hit during the 1994 currency crisis.  At year-end
1993, the total open position of the banking sector was US$4.6 billion, or 68% of total
equity.  The risks of such a capital structure became apparent only a few weeks later, when
the lira collapsed, losing half of its value in the first quarter of 1994. This currency crisis led
to large foreign exchange losses and higher loan defaults at most banks.  Net income for the
sector fell from US$1.9 billion in 1993 to US$0.9 billion in 1994. Moreover, a number of
20  This limit is now lowered to 30% of capital as a result of the agreement with the IMF
on a Staff Monitored Program.- 49 -
banks experienced severe liquidity problems. Three were dissolved, while another was
acquired by a stronger bank.  By the end of 1994,  the total open position of the banking
sector had narrowed to US$860 million, but it has since expanded again close to US$5 billion
by the end of 1997.
Table 26
TURKEY
Balance  Sheet  Open  Short  Foreign  Exchange  Positions  of Banks
US$ billions  Percentage  of Capital
1992  2.9  48
1993  4.6  68
1994  0.8  18
1995  3.1  51
1996  2.5  34
1997  4.9  55
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey.
There is a systemic aspect to this risk. Virtually all of the risk-taking banks are
positioned in the same direction, holding short foreign currency positions and borrowing
short and lending/investing long.  Moreover, these banks are the dominant players in both
currency and government securities markets. Therefore, if there is a strong rate movement
against either or both of these risk positions, the banking sector may move in unison to shed
it holdings, pushing the lira down and interest rates up, and leaving the Central Bank as the
sole stabilizing force in the market.  These factors suggest that the Central Bank may be
constrained in its policy options for crisis management. If, for example, it wishes to defend
the currency by raising interest rates sharply, such action would have serious consequences
for the banks because of their interest rate risk positions.
Quality of Loan Assets  One of the striking features of Turkey's private-sector banks
is the low ratio of loans to total assets, and the short-term nature of such loans.  While this
fact may cause some concerns, it has a beneficial liquidity effect - namely that a greater
proportion of assets can be held in more liquid asset-types, such as securities, and the loans
can be called and turned into more liquid assets more easily, The securities can provide
liquidity via sale, repo, or when pledged against interbank borrowings. On the other hand,
loans are still the largest asset item, and large credit risks have profound implications for
system liquidity.
The level oif  credit risk in the Turkish banking system appears to be moderately low
as measured by barnks  reported level of non-performing assets, and the banks appear to be- 50 -
reasonably well capitalized as shown in Table 15  .21 However, the current practice of loan
classification and loan loss provisioning may not provide an accurate picture of potential as
opposed to actual loan losses in the banking system.  The current loan loss classification
system is largely based on the number of days a loan is past due for principal. The problem
with this is that deteriorating credits are likely to be provisioned later than they should be.
By the time borrowers are unable to meet principal payments, there is a large probability that
the loan will be a loss to the bank.
One sign of the existence of larger than reported credit risks is that credit to the
private sector appeared to have grown very fast.  Commercial banks' claim on the private
sector grew in real terms by 44% in 1995 (which might to a large extent reflected making up
for the sharp contraction of 32% in lending to the private sector in 1994 ), 28% in 1996, and
22% in 1997. Thus the growth in bank credit to the private sector exceeded by a wide
margin the already rapid growth of GNP. The credit growth rates were very high as
compared to other large capital importers.  The nature of such lending is not clear (in terms
of sectoral concentration, etc), but it is noteworthy that consumer lending has assumed
increasing importance. Though consumer credits have been only a small part of the total
lending (about 9% as of end 1997), the volume of consumer credits have been growing very
fast - from US$1.9 billion as of end 1996 to US$2.9 billion as of end 1997 (a growth rate of
53%).  Such a high credit growth rate may not augur well for credit quality.  Turkish banks
may be subject to large credit losses if economic activity slows down, for example, due to
business cycle reasons.
Table 27
Turkey:  Growth  of Bank  Credit  to the Private  Sector
Relative  to the Growth  of GNP
Year  Real  Credit  Growth  Real  GNP  Growth  Difference
1992  14.3%  6.4%  7.9%
1993  15.3%  8.1%  7.2%
1994  -32.0%  -6.1%  -25.9%
1995  44.0%  8.0%  36.0%
1996  27.7%  7.1%  20.6%
1997  22.5%  8.0%  14.5%
Source: own calculation based on IFS.
21 The level of non-performing loans was reported to have increased sharply during 1998, as
a consequence of adverse economic conditions.-51  -
Table 28
Growth  of Bank  Credit  to the Private  Sector
Relative  to the Growth  of GDP  in Other  Countries
1990-94  1995  1996
Thailand  10.0%  11.1%  5.8%
Indonesia  10.4%  4.4%  5.7%
Malaysia  3.1%  10.5%  13.1%
Philippines  10.7%  27.4%  31.5%
Hong Kong  8.8%  8.9%  -6.1%
'Singapore  0.8%  7.8%  5.7%
'South  Korea  2.6%  2.2%  -0.6%
Mexico  25.7%  -0.6%  -36.0%
Source: Goldstein (1998), p8.
To what extent have capital inflows contributed to such high growth in domestic
credit? It is clear that lending to the private sector could not have grown by as much as it did
in 1992, 1993, and 1997, without the funds borrowed from abroad. In 1997, lending to the
private sector increased by US$5.6 billion and investments in government securities
increased by US$1.8 billion, whereas domestic liabilities increased by only US$2.2 billion.
Without the increase in foreign liabilities of US$3.3 billion, the growth in domestic credit
would not have been possible.  Equally important, reversal of foreign inflows in 1994 (an
outflow from the banking sector of US$6 billion) was the main reason for the sharp
contraction in lending to the private sector (a decrease of 32% in real terms). In 1995, the
growth in domestic credit was funded primarily by the growth in domestic liabilities. The
situation in 1996 was less clear, but it would be true to say that without the foreign financing
of US$2.8 billion, total domestic claims (investment in government securities and lending to
the private sector) could not have grown as much as they did.
The credit risks faced by Turkish banks are also closely linked with currency risks
they take. Banks are exposed to credit risk through currency risk since a portion of their
foreign currency loans go to companies which do not engage in foreign trade related business
(as the end of 1997, close to 60% of all non-preferential loans by the commercial banks were
foreign currency loans).  The bulk of the earnings of these companies are in domestic
currency and their debt repayment capacity would significantly deteriorate in the case of a
sharp exchange rate depreciation. Though the exact magnitude of such loans are not known,
indications from various sources are that they are sizable. In addition, as mentioned earlier,
banks carry large off-balance sheet guarantees, of which 73% is in foreign currency.  Such
guarantees could also carry high credit risks in the event of a sharp exchange rate
depreciation.
Regulatory  Deficiencies The absence of full consolidated supervision of banking
groups-i.e. of branches and subsidiaries-represents a serious weakness in Turkey's financial
regulatory framework, particularly from the perspective of external financial vulnerabilities.
There is anecdotal evidence of the formation of bank branches/subsidiaries by Turkish banks- 52 -
in foreign countries which lie outside the supervisory net (e.g., off-shore centers such as
Cyprus), and there is also anecdotal evidence that Turkish banks have begun to become
involved in more complex types of financial instruments in the international markets,
utilizing subsidiaries and special purpose vehicles.  The financial soundness of Turkish banks
could be seriously compromised by activities carried on out of the sight of its supervisors.
As we have shown in Section II, Turkish banks have made substantial investments abroad.
The quality of such foreign assets has important implications to the financial positions of
domestic banks. The liquidity of such assets also has important implications for foreign
exchange liquidity of the banking system. In addition, the existence of unsupervised cross-
border financial transactions could also add to the severity of a balance of payments crisis.
The dominance of industrial and commercial companies in the ownership of many of
Turkey's commercial banks also increases the importance of addressing the issue of
consolidated supervision. Recent developments demonstrated  the risks associated with
connected lending in the Turkish banking system.  Earlier in January 1999, the medium-sized
Interbank was taken over by the Deposit Insurance Fund. Most of Interbank's problems
arose from a large exposure to its parent company, Nergis Holding, one of the largest textile
companies in Turkey. The latter was severely affected by the downturn in the industry that
followed the Asian crisis.  Connected lending and concentrated credit portfolios exposed the
banks to imprudent concentration of credit risks. This case may indicate that the credit risks
faced by the Turkish banks could be far higher than implied by the apparently moderate level
of non-performing loans, and illustrates the importance of strengthening bank supervision to
protect the banking system from risks arising from the ownership of its banks by industrial
groups.
Excessive risk-taking in the banking system also reflects deficiency in the mechanism
for the resolution of problem banks. It has been open secret that quite a few small and
medium sized banks have been under special surveillance for a long time.  While being under
special surveillance, these banks are exempted from a number of prudential requirements,
creating perverse incentives for the banks to remain under special surveillance without taking
serious effort to improve and exit from that status.  In addition, an ineffective bank
liquidation process also weakens the disciplinary effect of bank exit policy.  Out of the five
banks which have been in liquidation in Turkey, two started in 1985, and the remaining three
started in 1994 after the currency crisis. The expectation is that it would take at least ten
years to terminate these liquidations. The main problem is a very slow court process that is
not suitable for bank liquidations. To be able to deal with future bank failures and to restore
the right incentives in the banking system, the authorities need to expedite the modernization
and reform of the legal and regulatory framework.
VII.  Conclusions
Net capital inflows to Turkey reached significant magnitude in 1993, 1996 and 1997,
surpassing four percent of GNP. The first half of 1998 has seen even bigger inflows, with
official foreign reserves increasing by about US$8 billion by mid 1998 as compared to end- 53 -
1997. In the midst of such large inflows, Turkey has maintained modest current account
deficits, with the result of increasing reserve accumulation. Within the current account, it is
noteworthy that the trade deficits (which now include an estimate of the so called "shuttle
trade") in recent years have been increasing and becoming fairly large (US$15 billion, or
7.7% of GNP, in 1997). Financing of the trade deficits has been made possible by the strong
positive balance oin  the invisibles account, especially non-interest and non-tourism revenues.
Part of these are likely to be speculative short-term flows, which may be subject to sudden
reversals. Turkey's relatively healthy current account position therefore relies to some extent
on unrecorded flows, which could be an important element in its external vulnerability.
Though the stock market in Turkey has grown tremendously in size and
sophistication in the past decade, and foreign residents now hold more than half of the free
float of the market capitalization, equity flows have not been as important as debt flows.
Among debt flowss,  foreign deposits with the banking sector and loans and credits to the non-
financial private sector were more important than portfolio flows.  The net foreign asset
position of the banking sector had been positive before 1997, but it turned negative for the
first time in 1997, and is likely to remain negative in 1998. Against the backdrop of such
large capital inflows, credit to the private sector has been growing very fast in recent years.
Such high credit growth does not augur well for the soundness of the banking sector.
The majority of the debt inflows were not intermediated through the domestic
banking system - the nonfinancial private sector has been a more important borrower of
foreign funds than the banking sector. However, the foreign borrowings of the non-financial
private sector often carried guarantees by the domestic banking sector, thus the banking
sector's exposure to foreign liabilities was much larger than their balance sheet items
indicate.  It is also noteworthy that, though the short-term debt stock was only one-fourth of
total debt stock, short-tenm  flows have dominated net inflows in most years.  On the other
hand, the volatility of short-ternm  flows of loans and deposits did not seem to be significantly
different from that of longer-term flows of loans and deposits.  This observation calls into
question the usefulness of the distinction between short-term and long-term flows.
Foreign diiect investments have been a small part of total capital flows, and the most
important pull factor of non-portfolio capital flows to Turkey seems to have been short-term
interest rate differential rather than growth opportunities in the economy. Since the exchange
rate depreciation rate has often lagged behind the rate of inflation, ex post real returns on
domestic debt have been generally higher in US$ terms than in TL terms.  This situation
encouraged both domestic asset substitution and foreign borrowing. On the other hand,
portfolio flows, which were mostly bonds issued abroad by the Turkish goveniment and
private sector, responded more to external "push" factors such as low international interest
rates than domestic "pull" factors as the interest rate differentials.
We have found that capital flows were positively associated with private consumption
and investment, but not public consumption and investment. Capital flows, therefore,
alleviated to some extent the inevitable crowding-out effect of high public sector deficits and
contributed to growth. Given the objectives of maintaining financial markets stability, the- 54 -
Central Bank did not have control either of its Net Domestic Assets due to its lending to the
Treasury before the 1994 crisis, or of its Net Foreign Assets due to its real exchange rate
target rule since late 1995. High inflation was an inevitable outcome given the combination
of high public sector deficits and accommodating  monetary policy.
Our analysis also shows the fundamental importance of fiscal policy in an era of large
capital flows. Fiscal imbalances were the key factor both contributing to real exchange rate
appreciation and leading to high real interest rates in Turkey. The high interest rates that
government must pay on domestic debt has become the core of Turkey's macroeconomic
problem.  In 1998, the government estimates that it will spend 10.5% of GNP on domestic
interest payments, up from less than 3% in 1992. Only if the government can find a way to
reduce its interest expenses can fiscal deficits be reduced and greater stability be achieved.
In addition, the fact that capital flows could quickly reverse themselves puts government
finance in a very vulnerable position. The government could find it very difficult to rollover
its debt in the midst of capital outflows. The shortened maturity structure of the Treasury
bills market has not only complicated monetary management, but also added one important
dimension to the macro vulnerability of the Turkish economy.
In the process of becoming increasingly  integrated with international financial
markets, the Turkish banking system has also become vulnerable to shifts in market
confidence. The high domestic interest rates, real exchange rate appreciation, and tax
distortions have induced banks to borrow abroad to finance both loans and positions in the
govenmment  paper market. In using the government securities for overnight repos, the banks
expose themselves to interest rate risk.  Some of the exchange rate risk on the loans is shifted
to the corporate borrowers by lending foreign exchange but the banks still have foreign
exchange risk to the extent they use foreign borrowing to finance their purchases of
government paper.  The banks are also exposed to large credit risks as a result of lending in
foreign currency to customers which have unhedged foreign currency positions, or by
providing guarantees to customers that borrow directly from abroad in foreign currency. The
exchange and interest rates risks taken by banks pose systemic problems in that all of the
institutions have virtually the same exposure, namely short foreign exchange and longer
dated government paper. The markets would prove very thin and volatile should banks
decide to exit in unison.
The risk positions were induced by a volatile and distorted macroeconomic
environment, and a reflection of moral hazard created by extensive government guarantees
on deposits and regulatory forbearance. High volatility in the main macroeconomic variables
is a product of high inflation and will continue until there is much greater price stability.
Turkey cannot have a sound banking system without a substantial reduction in inflation.
While it is difficult to engineer a stabilization  program without both interest rate and
exchange rate shocks, which could cause difficulty for the weaker banks, effective
supervisory actions should be undertaken against non-compliance with prudential regulations
so that the market and credit risks in the system will be reduced, which will help enhance the
credibility of the stabilization  program. In short, strengthening financial regulation and- 55 -
achieving macroeconomic stabilization should go hand in hand in order to reduce external
vulnerability of the Turkish economy.- 56 -
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